Unheimlichkeit: alienated and integrated identities and criminal existence(s) by Amatrudo, Anthony
  
 
Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law 
Antigua Universidad s/n - Apdo.28 20560 Oñati - Gipuzkoa – Spain 
Tel. (+34) 943 783064 / Fax (+34) 943 783147 
E: opo@iisj.es W: http://opo.iisj.net 969 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 5, n. 3 (2015) – Existential Dimensions in the Socio-Legal Sphere 
ISSN: 2079-5971 
Unheimlichkeit: Alienated and Integrated Identities and 
Criminal Existence(s) 
ANTHONY AMATRUDO∗ 
Amatrudo, A., 2015. Unheimlichkeit: Alienated and Integrated Identities and Criminal 
Existence(s). Oñati Socio-legal Series [online], 5 (3), 969-981. Available from: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2624580  
 
Abstract 
This essay argues that we should reinterpret Merton’s retreatist category by using 
Heidegger’s notion of unheimlichkeit (uncanniness) which relates to the claim that 
our consciousness and sense-making are grounded in our own openness to finitude. 
It will also make use of Heidegger’s concept of Dasein which relates to the 
uncovering of a primal nature of Being (Sein). When we do this we note how the 
existential potential of this category are at once released from the bonds of an 
overly objectivised Sociology and open to the possibility of a richer understanding 
of action and motivation within this class of persons. It argues that we should make 
Durkheim compatible with Marx. This is if one allows that the empirical basis for 
Durkheim’s ‘social condition’ is as set out by Marx. Durkheim was preoccupied by 
the micro-level of analysis and Marx with wider economic conditions of the 
nineteenth century. Merton was tied up with detailing the America of his day and 
with individualized goal-setting and means-ends rationality. By employing the 
concept of unheimlichkeit in relation to Merton’s work we open up a new form of 
explanation able to understand the psychic and existential striving for meaning, 
that Heidegger terms Dasein. 
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Resumen 
Este ensayo defiende que debemos reinterpretar la categoría retraída de Merton 
utilizando la noción de unheimlichkeit (extrañeza) de Heidegger, que se refiere a la 
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exigencia de que nuestra consciencia y toma de decisiones se basan en nuestra 
aceptación de la finitud. También emplea el concepto de Heidegger del Dasein que 
se refiere al descubrimiento de una naturaleza primigenia del ser (Sein). Al hacer 
esto se observa cómo el potencial existencial de esta categoría se libera de las 
ataduras de una sociología excesivamente objetivizada, y se abre a la posibilidad de 
un entendimiento más rico de la acción y motivación entre este tipo de personas. 
Se defiende que deberíamos hacer que Durkheim sea compatible con Marx. Esto 
ocurriría si se permitiera que la base empírica de la “condición social” de Durkheim 
fuera como presentada por Marx. Durkheim estaba preocupado por un análisis 
micro-nivel y Marx con las condiciones económicas, más amplias, del siglo XIX. 
Merton estaba comprometido con describir la América de su época, y con establecer 
metas individualizadas, y racionalidad de medios y fines. Al emplear el concepto de 
unheimlichkeit en relación con el trabajo de Merton, se abre una nueva forma de 
explicación capaz de comprender el esfuerzo de comprensión psíquico y existencial 
que Heidegger denomina Dasein. 
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1. Control followed by alienation 
The argument that follows seeks to reinstate Durkheim’s Socialism and look again 
at his work on anomie mindful of the need to see beyond Merton’s attention upon 
simple material success and look again at Durkheim’s idea of moral regulation. By 
Socialism I mean a critical concentration upon the material conditions that structure 
life. As well as rescuing the original sense of anomie there will be an analysis of 
what one might term, Durkheim’s fatalism (Lukes 1973). There is a need to 
reinstate Durkheim’s concern for anomie as it relates directly to a crisis in 
capitalism and away from the individualized goal-setting and means-ends 
rationality of Merton and mid-twentieth century America. We should make 
Durkheim compatible with Marx. For too long scholars have juxtaposed Marx and 
Durkheim and they have done this by contrasting Marx’s notion of alienation with 
Durkheim’s concept of anomie: in fact both thought excessive regulation harmful, 
though Durkheim tended to focus on under regulation. If the focus is kept upon 
Durkheim’s, admitted undeveloped, notion of fatalism then we see, more clearly, 
how Marx and Durkheim can indeed be compatible. Late modernity exhibits both 
excessive social regulation which in turn leads to alienation and also a real lack of 
integrative restraint, which in turn leads to anomie: both existential features exist 
side by side and there is no contradiction in this being the case. Traditionally 
anomie and fatalism have been two separate treatments to the issue of social 
regulation. However, Durkheim does have a nascent theory of fatalism and it is to 
be found in Suicide where he lists fatalistic suicide in opposition to anomic, egoistic 
and altruistic suicides (Kushner and Sterk 2005). It is essential to note here that 
Durkheim understood suicide as happening when the force of collective sanctions is 
displaced by a loss, or breakdown, of moral direction; and when the actor is no 
longer concerned by the social collective. David Lockwood (1992, p. 21) has 
highlighted how: “...anomie means the horizons become abruptly widened so that 
aspirations know no bounds, fatalism refers to hopes so narrow and diminished that 
even life itself becomes a matter of indifference.” We should acknowledge that 
fatalism is part of the Durkheimian account and it is an element in his, broader 
consideration of social regulation and then follow Steven Lukes in seeing it as akin 
to Marx’s sense of alienation: both being essentially powerless states, though with 
Marx associated with capitalism and with over-regulation (Lukes 1967).  The two 
views are compatible if one sees the empirical basis for Durkheim’s social conditions 
as provided by Marx. The two are both concerned with social regulation and order 
but we should note how though Durkheim is concerned with a full range of human 
endeavour, at the micro-level of analysis, whereas Marx confined his ideas to 
capitalism and to wider economic conditions more generally. Moreover, in Marx 
alienation is not only a specific form of mentality under a given form of social 
regulation but linked to what he termed “self-denial” i.e. under capitalism 
individuals are subject to an external force which denies such material things as are 
necessary to our human essence. The concept of unheimlichkeit (uncanniness) will 
also be considered to furnish an explanatory description to the psychic and 
existential striving for meaning, that Heidegger terms Dasein. 
It is to be noted that anomic suicides occur, according to Durkheim, when the usual 
power of the collective sanction is lost through a loss of moral faith in social 
direction resulting in excessive freedom. Suicide is an example of a serious lack of 
social integration (Taylor 1982). However, Durkheim also has an account of 
fatalism which though completely contrary to anomie, in that it focuses on over-
regulation, should be understood as part of the broader treatment of social 
regulation in his work (Pearce 1979). Acevedo (2003, pp. 75-76) has stated: 
“Anomie and fatalism thus relate to the margins of human passions and the 
extreme form of social structure that each condition addresses. Anomie is a 
condition that knows no limits where. Alternatively, the passions of the fatalist are 
unmistakably constrained and “pitilessly blocked” by the enduring burden of over-
regulation. The introduction of egoism and altruism completes Durkheim’s complex 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 5, n. 3 (2015), 969-981 
ISSN: 2079-5971 972 
Anthony Amatrudo   Unheimlichkeit: Alienated and Integrated… 
 
portrait of human nature and allows for a more complete evaluation of the human 
condition.” It is very much part of Durkheim’s account that by studying fatalistic 
suicide we discern the action of social forces which, in this an example, are able to 
estrange an alienate individuals. It would be wrong to argue that Durkheim’s work 
ends with anomie and is unable to conceive of regulatory social conditions that 
dehumanize, and alienate, the individual. For Durkheim the optimal social 
regulatory arrangements must lie somewhere between anomie and fatalism. 
Moreover, this is an altogether more convincing position that that found in Marx. 
Marx could not conceive of anomie and therefore tended to romanticise the 
alienation inherent in capitalist production (Lukes 1967). It may well be that Marx 
saw himself, and is best understood, as a heroic thinker but Durkheim is best 
understood as a pragmatist in his treatment of social regulation and its attendant 
mechanisms. After all, individuals are, in fact, subject to both inadequate forms of 
social regulation, with their tendency to anomie, and coercive structural forces, 
which can lead to fatalistic rationality. All this is fertile ground for unheimlichkeit. 
2. Social solidarity, violence and anomie in Durkheim 
Durkheim understood Sociology as an essential antidote to the disorder and anomie 
that is endemic to late modernity. Sociology would be the science that confronted 
the disintegration of the social world: it alone would curtail violence and it would do 
this through a programme of moral education and positive socialization. For 
Durkheim the notion that violence was in some way useful, even redemptive, was 
rejected out of hand. All violence does is infect the social world and undermine 
social solidarity. In the Durkheimian account violence is to be limited through a 
process of regulation that internalized within the individual. Durkheim argued that 
there was the need for a moral code that is both bigger, and more important, than 
the individual incidence of the self. Durkheim thought of violence in terms of both 
its symbolic and actualized forms. Nonetheless, in the Durkheimian account, 
violence is understood ambivalently for in seeking to condemn its harmful effects 
upon individuals and communities there is a realisation that it has a definite role in 
regulating persons for the good of the nomos (in other words the customs, habits 
and behaviour that are constructed socially over time) and that punishment of 
those who breach necessary regulations by succumbing to anomie should be duly 
chastised. The Durkheimian project would be a moral one aimed at the regulation 
of the body and the mind. We note that Durkheim was considering violence in a 
variety of forms i.e. epistemological, symbolical and real (or actualised). However, 
he noted that violence was also a social fact and as such a perennial feature of all 
societies. It is worth recalling here that whilst Durkheim sought to reduce violence 
he nonetheless saw a role for it in social regulation. As Lukes and Prabhat (2012) 
have stated Durkheim gives us a: “picture of society unified around a common 
morality and … without legal enforcement of its morals through the criminal law, 
there would be moral and thus social disintegration.” Yet anomie is far more than a 
simple deficit in law or regulation. The concept of anomie begs deeper questions 
about how to structure the social world which bear upon political theory, as well as 
highlighting a pathological trait within individuals. Anomie is essentially a moral 
designation which exhibits a disintegration of the social bonds that preserve 
civilization (Durkheim 1984). It is a prerequisite for violence either in the shape of 
crime or suicide, which should be considered an essentially violent and destructive 
act (Durkheim 1984). The history of Sociology demonstrates how the concept of 
anomie has persisted long after Durkheim’s death in 1917. Though, subsequent 
followers of Durkheim, notably Talcott Parsons, though true to his realism 
nonetheless systematically stripped the concept of any metaphysical elements that 
were originally intended.  It have previously argued (Amatrudo 2009, p. 21) that: 
“Merton followed Durkheim but switched his focus from the moral regulation of 
individuals to the demoralisation that necessarily follows when individuals seek 
personal affirmation in material success. Where Durkheim had focused upon rapid 
social change, Merton focused upon the strains of succeeding in a materialist 
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culture.” The term anomie became little more than an element in a typology, an 
analytic tool for the classification of norms and deviance from them. Anomie was 
freed up to be used in the analysis of any disordered social situation. It was Merton 
who re-wrote the concept of anomie most completely when its original sense (which 
related not to a crisis in late modernity and a failure of organic solidarity but to the 
birth of modernity) was replaced by a failure of agreement over legitimate, in terms 
of the dominant group goals (Merton 1993). The Mertonian concept of anomie is 
little more than a social structural problem relating to an imbalance between certain 
goals, that are over-determined and the accompanying means of achieving them, 
which are correspondingly underdetermined. As I (Amatrudo 2009, p. 20) have 
previously note: “Merton emphasised the relationship between culture and social 
structure far more than anyone had done previously. Merton’s primary aim was to 
discover how social structures exert a definite pressure on individuals to engage in 
non-conforming, rather than conforming conduct. He drew a distinction between 
culturally defined goals, which he saw as desirable, and the legitimate means of 
achieving those goals. Whenever goals and means are harmoniously integrated the 
result is a well-regulated society. ‘Strain’ is said to occur where there is a 
disjuncture between culturally defined goals and the institutionalised means of 
obtaining them. American society, argued Merton, overemphasised the goal of 
monetary success, relative to other goals. Following Durkheim he argued that the 
relationship between culturally defined goals and the legitimate means of achieving 
them, led to anomie and because the American economic system had built-in 
insatiability, in terms of the material aspirations it raised.  In other words, anomie 
occurs within the social structure itself and is, in turn, a measure of the gap 
between goals and means in society. Strain theory, in this regard, is a theory with 
definite economic overtones.” To be fair Merton was interested in the social 
causation of anomie whereas Durkheim more with the consequences of it. Following 
Merton American Sociology went on to use a version of anomie, as a measure, to 
scale and quantify deviations from the norm and in its wake criminologists invoked 
anomie to explain almost everything from petty crime to prostitution to alcoholism 
(Agnew 1995). However, in following the Mertonian anomie so slavishly the critical 
and, undoubtedly, political elements of Durkheim’s original analysis were lost. 
The concept of anomie became central to sociological analysis and very useful in 
that it signifies a lack of law or culture. If there is anomie then what form of law 
should we apply? How stable, or otherwise, is the state of anomie? In Durkheim the 
concept is straightforward if not entirely without its own complexities. Anomie is a 
state where all forms of social disaggregation could be put together (Sirianni 1984). 
Durkheim sets out his position on anomie most clearly in The Division of Labour in 
Society in which he gives due weight to concern for social determination (Durkheim 
1984, p. 5). To quote in full: “(Society) is the arbiter naturally designed to settle 
interests in conflict and to assign to each its suitable limits. Then it has the chief 
interest in order and peace; if anomy if evil, it is above all because society suffers 
from it, being unable to live without cohesion and regularity. A moral or juridical 
regulation essentially expresses then social needs that society alone can feel; it 
rests in a state of opinion and all opinion is a collective thing, produced by collective 
elaboration. For anomie to end, there must exist, or be formed, a group which can 
constitute the system of rules actually needed . . . this is what is called the 
corporation or occupational group.”  
The level of social morality is related directly to the level of anomie where there is a 
level of anomie social solidarity (morality) is undermined. Durkheim links law, 
morality and social solidarity in an unproblematic fashion and seems to be arguing 
that anomie is that which evades social integration. Civic harmony is related 
directly to social solidarity, and there is a nod to Thomas Hobbes here when he 
writes (Durkheim 1984, p. 39) of the state of nature: “… the state of nature of the 
philosophers of the nineteenth century, if not immoral is, at least, amoral.” 
Durkheim, we must never forget, was a Socialist and it was his view that 
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individualism was all well and good but only so long as one’s duty to oneself is in 
accord with the collective duties one has to the social (social solidarity). When the 
individual’s aims and objectives are out of kilter with the social body then there 
arises the possibility of anomie and with it the denial of the social body; and 
thereafter the presence of violence, as a direct result of it. This is especially 
problematic in a social body cohering to organic solidarity, as Greenhouse (2011) 
has shown. Where there is increased independence as in organic solidarity (in 
contra-distinction to mechanical solidarity) there follows the requirement for 
heightened levels of social regulation. Anomie can be allayed with social solidarity 
but where this is not the case Durkheim maintains that a division of labour, of 
whatever kind, cannot bring forth social solidarity by itself. This is because where 
anomie is present increased social regulation is called for; indeed it is the only 
solution whatever the social structural arrangements (Durkheim 1984, p. 368). 
Agnew (1995, p. 64) followed this line of reasoning when arguing for increased 
levels of “social support” to cope with strain in relation to youth crime. What 
Durkheim and Agnew fail to do is to seriously consider the inner world of those 
subject to anomie. This is a major failure not least because it results in a rather 
undeveloped anthropology i.e. account of both the person and of humanity in 
general. 
Anomie is, however, always noted as something out of the ordinary. Durkheim 
maintains that the division of labour will always work against anomie and that 
anomic persons (notably criminals) are, in effect, challenging the existing social 
relations. In this sense anomie is a form of rebellion. The only sure remedy for 
anomie is increased social interdependence and regulation. Moreover, anomic 
persons need to be publicly censured for their failure to maintain their obligations 
to the social body (Durkheim 1984, p. 85). The criminal’s failure to support the 
collective consciousness deserves the legal sanction of punishment. Crime in this 
sense has both a tangible political dimension but also a metaphysical one too. The 
institution of punishment is, in the Durkheimian model, both necessary to preserve 
social solidarity but also a channel for the violent emotions of the community. 
Punishment is conceived of by Durkheim as another form of submission; and a 
route to the true freedom that is only possible through social solidarity. As Lukes 
and Prabhat (2012, p. 367) put it: “Law involves some institutionalized means for 
publicly declaring and enforcing norms. The organization and institutionalization of 
law renders it highly visible. Law ‘is nothing more than the most stable and precise 
element in this very organization. … Thus we may be sure to find reflected in the 
law all the essential varieties of social solidarity.’ Durkheim seeks ways to put 
“social solidarity” into operation. He says that ‘we must therefore substitute for this 
internal datum, which escapes us, an external one which symbolizes it and then 
study the former through the latter. That visible symbol is the law.” Durkheim 
thought that violence could be eliminated through a social solidarity that reflects 
the positive conscience collective and upholds order. This order, though 
authoritarian, would also be the guarantor of civic life and therefore ought to be 
welcomed as the protector of individual personhood and community continuity. 
3. Habermas 
Habermas (1995, p. 285) maintains that: "(Marx, Durkheim and Weber explain 
systematic pathologies of modernization, such as) ...when forms of economic and 
administrative rationality encroach upon areas of life whose internal communicative 
structures cannot be rationalized according to those criteria." Yet Habermas (1995, 
p. 84) is also very clear, when discussing Durkheim and the development of organic 
solidarity, that the autonomy that comes with organic solidarity is largely focused 
upon “reflecting self-understanding” wherein solidarity is no longer secured by a 
“prior value consensus but ... achieved by virtue of individual efforts.” The life of 
organic solidarity is also the life of the mind, rationalism and negotiated meaning. 
The legal form it throws up too is one of complex juridification processes, legal 
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validity and questions surrounding the legitimacy of law (Killion 2010, p. 1). Life is 
complex and so is the law that preserves civic order under states of organic 
solidarity; and this stands in marked contrast to the, comparatively, straightforward 
existence enjoyed under mechanical solidarity. There are, Habermas (1995, p. 91-
88) maintains, complexities that occur under social conditions of organic solidarity 
that simply do not apply under social conditions of mechanical solidarity. 
4. An uncanny insight 
For Heidegger the essential quality of thought was simply what it means to inhabit 
a meaningful world. However, he thought of meaningfulness and the forging of 
meaningfulness as essentially fragile and finite. The finite is revealed in the ways in 
which meaningful experiences can be fleeting. His work on this process may be 
found in Sartre’s notion of nausea (Sartre 1964). Underpinning Heidegger’s ideas 
about experience and finitude is a less defined notion of anxiety or angst. Angst 
being best understood in terms of the way in our ordinary lives we come to face the 
profound truth of our existence; with a sense of unease. There is strangeness to 
this activity of inhabiting our deepest sense of self. Heidegger (1979, p. 188) says 
that in this angst we get a sense of unheimlich. The English translation was often 
given as “un-homely” but is best rendered in terms of a feeling of un-
comfortableness, strangeness and unsettledness. In any case unheimlich is now 
usually translated as “uncanny” with an emphasis on the idea of unfamiliarity.  It 
follows that when we come across the finite and fragile nature of meaningfulness in 
our everyday lives we are said to detect un-comfortableness in that encounter. 
Heidegger’s unheimlichkeit is essentially about our human existential state and the 
fundamental human relationship with finitude: it is about being uncanny not about 
feeling uncanny. It is an important existentialist insight although Heidegger 
unfortunately never fully defined the term technically in his writings. However, in 
Sein und Zeit (Heidegger 2006, p. 188) he stated: “In der Angst ist einem 
Unheimlich” which is best rendered in English as “in anxiety one is uncanny.” It is 
not an easy state of being to inhabit. 
In its earliest incarnation (in Sein und Zeit) unheimlich relates to being or feeling, 
angst. It is portrayed as, what philosophers call, an affective phenomenon. 
However, in Heidegger it has a focus on the existential and the ontological in that it 
is directed at an analysis of human essence. Unheimlich does not only refer to a 
feeling but to a feeling which illustrates a characteristic of human essence: it has a 
deeper sense. Hubert Dreyfus (1991, p. 37) argued that unheimlich signifies that: 
“human beings can never be at home in the world.” In Heidegger’s later work 
unheimlich is given a more central role though its sense is similarly opaque. 
Heidegger (2006, p. 161) uses unheimlichkeit both in his lecture on Sophocles’ 
Antigone and seminally in the Introduction to Metaphysics; wherein he terms 
unheimlich: “the basic trait of human essence into which every other trait must be 
drawn.” It thereby affords it, according to Lacoue-Labarthe (1993), an existential 
and ontological centrality as something which is essential to human essence and 
the “estrangement of the human.” Heidegger (1998) also makes reference to 
unheimlich in his Parmenides lectures. It is important to note the persistence of the 
term unheimlich in Heidegger’s work over time: it is a key technical term in his 
corpus. It provides an important insight for him in terms of what we might term the 
limitations of meaningfulness and on the empirical basis of human self-
understanding. 
Sigmund Freud also wrote of das Unheimlich and shifted the emphasis away from 
aesthetics and towards the self; and re-oriented it in terms of his own work into 
psychoanalysis. Freud understood unheimlich, as a sense of un-familiarity that also 
included familiarity. In Freud unheimlich is the familiar, but strangely so. Freud 
understands it as something familiar, now become unfamiliar, through an internal 
mental process of repression (and we note the psychoanalytical usage here). The 
uncanny (unheimlich) is a process, or sense, which relates to the way in which the 
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familiar and the unfamiliar are mixed. However, Freud and Heidegger were not 
close and there is little evidence that Heidegger ever read Freud’s work (Krell 1997, 
p. 101). So we should note Freud’s use of das Unheimlich but beware too much 
emphasis on an inter-textual approach or a cod-hermeneutics of unheimlich. It is a 
term used commonly in the German language but it is quite unlikely that Heidegger 
was not aware of Freud’s essay of 1919 (Freud 2003). Moreover, Heidegger’s sense 
affords far more emphasis upon the ability of individuals to understand the notion 
of un- in the uncanny, since it seems to demarcate the meaningful from the un-
meaningful. In other words it sets the parameters of the meaningful. It is important 
in determining the limits of self-understanding and yet is part of that self-
understanding. Individuals become uncanny only when they fail to grasp their own 
innate un-canniness. Unheimlich points to a self-estrangement essential to human 
existence: and it is what defines who and what we are. It is in this sense 
existential. It is precisely because we are unintelligible to ourselves that we strive 
to make our existence intelligible. 
It is the striving for intelligibility that Heidegger terms Dasein. The notion that 
human beings always try and make their being intelligible is at the heart of 
Heidegger’s existentialism. It is a sine qua non in the Heideggerian account that in 
the activity of understanding being that which is undertaking the understanding 
cannot fully grasp itself or its own finitude. Dasein requires a notion of what we 
might term reflexive finitude i.e. a reflexive finitude in our own sense-making, or if 
you like, a radical, and essential, deficit in our self-understanding. We can never 
render our uncanniness intelligible whatever we do as our ability to make sense of 
things is essentially flawed. Heidegger’s insight is in noting that uncanniness not 
merely refers to a type of experience, or sense, but that it is an essential element 
in our essence that ensures that such experiences, or senses, are an ever-present 
and necessary aspect of our lives. Uncanniness (unheimlichkeit) explains a finitude 
in human existence and should be understood as such, rather than as a mere 
affective phenomenon.  In short, Heidegger’s account of unheimlichkeit is part of a 
broader ontological approach within his philosophy which addresses the central 
issues of just what it means to make things meaningful and what counts for there 
to be an understanding of being at all and what are the conditions for Dasein. 
Heidegger’s existentialism is about the notion of making the world one’s own, even 
though the world itself cannot be altered or fully known, and the realization that 
such a life is forever a striving for knowledge and being. This point has been made, 
at length by von Herrmann (1985). Our encounters with phenomenon (which are 
essentially what we might term carriers of meaning) are the basis of being. 
Heidegger shows us how through our association with phenomenon we come to see 
how these phenomena coincide with that which is indicated (von Herrmann 1985, 
p. 113). This insight (that signs are not merely a substitute for what is indicated 
but actually an indication of what is already indicated) entails a radical 
hermeneutical approach to knowledge and being. The phenomenon of the world is 
primordial and indeed is prior to our phenomenological exposure to being (Sein). 
We manifest as das Seiende im Ganzen (beings in a whole). However, as Crewe 
(2009, p. 21) notes: “Dasein is phenomenological; it emerges from our experience, 
that is, from our experience of ourselves and of others in the world. Hence Dasein 
is not an individual human, but the property of individuals in virtue of their Being 
that is universal in humans. What is fundamental to us is in our experience of 
ourselves and others in the world.” So Dasein is only possible where its own self-
understanding is reflexively finite in regard to understanding its own finitude-ness. 
This is unheimlichkeit - the reflexive understanding of our own finitude towards 
Dasein. It is the constant imperfection that is the central aspect of all human 
understanding. We are what we are precisely because we cannot grasp our own 
uncanniness (McGuirk 2010). 
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5. Capitalism, organic solidarity, unheimlichkeit and strain 
The issues that flow from this concept of unheimlichkeit, in Heidegger, can be 
related to the social processes detailed by Durkheim and Marx and elaborated by 
Habermas and Merton. To some extent these thinkers are all drawing water from 
the same well. All of them concerned primarily with life conditions existing under 
what we might choose to call capitalist social relations, organic solidarity, the 
modern world, our contemporary polity. Unheimlichkeit is a rather intellectual 
notion yet it is one that, however, ill-defined by either Heidegger or Freud, seems 
to resonate with the negotiated sense of meaning that Habermas highlighted in the 
Durkheim’s Division of Labour. Moreover, Marx’s sense of alienation is also a 
psychic state associated with over-regulation which chimes with the innate mental 
fragility of unheimlichkeit. It is easy to criticise Merton as being too taken with the 
economic conditions of mid-twentieth century America and for neglecting the inner 
life of persons within his general strain theory. The usefulness of unheimlichkeit is 
in its potential to furnish a map of the mental life of persons. If we follow the 
Freudian version of unheimlichkeit moreover we note the idea of a sense of un-
familiarity which also included familiarity: a sense of complexity. This difficult and 
complicated sense (unheimlichkeit) is surely exacerbated in the attenuated 
existential environment pertaining to late modernity. Much of Durkheim’s work is 
concerned to integrate individuals through social regulation but where that 
regulation is absent, or wanting, surely some form of alienation (or anomie) might 
follow. The cognitive dissonance, in the sense of a form of mental stress, within our 
understanding we might also term unheimlichkeit: and see it as a limit on our 
ability to see the world clearly and negotiate life successfully and set goals for 
ourselves within it. It seems to highlight the difficulty of understanding ourselves in 
the world. Therefore, of the five categories Merton sets out in his typology of modes 
of individual adaption (conformity; innovation; ritualism; retreatism; rebellion) it is 
retreatism primarily which looks ripe for reconsideration in the light of 
unheimlichkeit. We must first recall that Merton did not see economics as the main 
cause of crime so much as crime being the failure to integrate one’s own culturally 
derived goals and the ability to achieve them, given existing institutional means. In 
this limited sense Merton sets up an existential question for the individual. How am 
I to live, and choose to live, in the future given the goals that the world sets out for 
me? He is concerned with the inner life and individual motivation of individuals. It is 
no surprise, therefore, that he saw failure to integrate one’s aspirant goals, and the 
legitimate means of achieving them, as giving rise in the Mertonian account, in 
Colin Sumner’s (1984, p. 121) words, to: “Psychopathology … retained as an 
operative concept.” Moreover, as Sumner (1984, p. 78) also notes Merton’s: 
“concept of the unanticipated consequences of social action … and (concept) of the 
idiosyncratic deviant.” This state of psychopathology ushered in by the unexpected 
outcomes of social action needs to be reinserted into the way we read Merton. For 
Merton though there is the social system level and the materially generated desire 
for personal progress and fulfilment at the macro but there is also the micro world 
of individual and idiosyncratic psychic life, not all of it well resolved, and much of it 
confusing and uncertain. The inner world of persons is ever familiar, ever 
unfamiliar. In many ways it is the world of unheimlichkeit. Indeed, the capitalist 
world would seems to exacerbate the problem in forever altering our needs and 
desires. 
6. Action in Heidegger 
Let us examine the dominant causal account of action, as exemplified by Donald 
Davidson (2001) because it is helps us better understand both Merton’s technical 
account of strain theory and Heidegger’s understanding of the human condition. 
Davidson’s (2001, pp. 3-4) view is that a reason for action consists of: “having 
some sort of pro-attitude towards actions of a certain kind and believing (or 
knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering) an action is of that kind.” Pro-
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attitudes are best understood as wants, urges and desires and, if you like, the sort 
of goals set out by Merton. In Davidson when a person has a reason to perform an 
action they have a desire, (i.e. of the type motivation that encompasses wants, 
urges and desires), to perform a certain sort of action and has a corresponding 
belief, (i.e. perception or knowledge), that the particular action under consideration 
is of the preferred sort. He states that it is the combination of a pro-attitude and its 
allied belief (i.e. perception or knowledge) are the essential reason for action. 
Moreover, if we can explain the primary reason for any action then we would have 
explained the action too. This is compatible with the view set out by Heidegger 
(1988) and Davidson (2001) for it seems able to accommodate both his 
behaviourist account which posits action is socially conditioned and his analytical 
account that argues that action is conditioned by personal understanding and which 
sees mental states as having the primary role in any account of action. However, 
though Heidegger had behaviourist elements in his work his dominant view was 
that such stimuli were only possible because of our capacity to both understand 
ourselves and our own environment and therefore able, in turn, to determine how 
things matter to individuals and affect them (Dreyfus 1991). In Heidegger it is 
deliberation and the mental states that it ushers forth that determine our actions 
inasmuch as they allow things to matter to persons. This is also an account of 
human motivation (Davis 2007). Heidegger puts a lot of stress upon our capacity 
for reflection to account for action or put another way that our actions are caused 
by prior mental events. Heidegger’s account of action upholds a reciprocal 
interdependence of both active and passive elements to elaborate a nuanced notion 
of causality which was later picked up by Merleau-Ponty (2006, p. 130). Heidegger 
saw our self-understanding, or lack of it, as important in understanding the things 
we are drawn towards. Heidegger understood agency as being configured in terms 
of a passive aspect, i.e. various elements and activities in the world and an active 
aspect, i.e. which entails a self-understanding that allows such things to matter to 
individuals. 
As we saw with the concept of unheimlichkeit the picture Heidegger paints seems to 
coincide very neatly with the work of Merton; supplementing it with a sophisticated 
anthropology and furnishing it with a richer set of tones. In linking action to mental 
processes Heidegger gives us a view of the individual, in the retreatism category, 
which has real explanatory force. Such persons do not act because they are not 
motivated to. They have no desire, want, or urge to set goals and engage in pro-
attitudinal thinking and to begin to act in a way directed at positive outcomes. 
Moreover, in his Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger sets out a 
behaviourist account that posits that to some extent action is socially conditioned 
which would seem to support Merton’s notion of how social structures impose 
themselves upon the values that individuals come to uphold (Merton 1993, pp. 199-
200). 
7. Conclusion 
Merton showed how his retreatism category is associated with those who duck out 
of the complexity of the modern world with its meaning-making and familiar-
unfamiliar and the understanding of forever being unintelligible to ourselves. 
Persons in the retreatism category typically present as “tramps, alcoholics, drug 
addicts and psychotics” who make up a large percentage of the criminal population. 
Moreover, as I previously noted (Amatrudo 2009, p. 21), Merton never saw the 
issue of drug addiction and life lived on the streets as causing anomie: rather they 
are to be understood as being the result of anomie. Retreatism is the escape 
mechanism used by individuals living in societies characterised by organic solidarity 
and capitalist economic relations come to resolve their internal conflicts between 
both the external moral constraints against illegitimate means and their failure to 
succeed by legitimate means. This understanding is internal and it is existential. 
Maybe this is the truer notion Merton had in mind and not the one heavily indebted 
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to sub-cultural theory which resolves the obvious indeterminacy by giving an 
objectivised sociological reading unable, and unwilling, to ponder the existential 
issues of the retreatism category (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960). So it is to Heidegger 
we should look for his concept of unheimlichkeit and his description of action and 
motivation seems to give a richer understanding to the work of Merton. When we 
have done that we recognise that our capitalist world presents us with alienated 
identities living criminal existences. 
References 
Acevedo, G.A., 2003. Turning Anomie on its Head: Fatalism as Durkheim’s 
Concealed and Multidimensional Alienation Theory. Sociological Theory, 23 
(1), 75-85. 
Agnew, R., 1995. Controlling Delinquency: recommendations from general strain 
theory. In: H. Barlow, ed., Crime and Public Policy: putting theory to work. 
Boulder: Westview Press, 43-70. 
Amatrudo, A., 2009. Criminology and Political Theory. London and Los Angeles: 
Sage. 
Cloward, R. and Ohlin, L., 1960. Delinquency and opportunity: a theory of 
delinquent gangs. Glencoe: Free Press. 
Crewe, D., 2009. Will to self-consummation, and will to crime; a study in criminal 
motivation. In: R. Lippens and D. Crewe, eds. Existential Criminology. 
Abingdon: Routledge, 12-50. 
Davidson, D., 2001. Actions, Reasons, and Causes. In: Essays on Actions and 
Event. Oxford University Press, 1-55. 
Davis, B.W., 2007. Heidegger and the Will: on the way to Gelassehheit. Evenston: 
Northwestern University Press. 
Dreyfus, H., 1991. Being in the World: a Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and 
Time. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Durkheim, E., 1984. The Division of Labour in Society. Ed. L .Coser, tr. W.D. Halls. 
New York: Free Press. 
Freud, S., 2003. The Uncanny. London: Penguin. 
Greenhouse, C.J., 2011. Durkheim and Law: Divided Readings over Division of 
Labour. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 7, 165-185. 
Habermas, J., 1995. The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume Two. Oxford: 
Polity Press, 81-88. 
Heidegger, M., 1979. Sein und Zeit, Tubingen: Max Niemeyer. 
Heidegger, M., 1988. Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Tr. A. Hofstadter. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Heidegger, M., 1998. Parmenides. Tr. A. Schuwer and R. Rojcewitz. Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press. 
Heidegger, M., 2006. Sein und Zeit. Tubingen: Niemeyer. 
Herrmann, F-W. von, 1985. Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins: Eine 
Erläuterung von “Sein und Zeit”, I. Einleitung: Die Exposition der Frage nach 
dem Sinn von Sein. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 
Killion, M.U., 2010. The Function of Law in Habermas’ Modern Society. Global Jurist, 
10 (2), 266-290. 
Krell, D.F., 1997. Architecture: ecstasies of space, time and the human body. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 5, n. 3 (2015), 969-981 
ISSN: 2079-5971 980 
Anthony Amatrudo   Unheimlichkeit: Alienated and Integrated… 
 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 5, n. 3 (2015), 969-981 
ISSN: 2079-5971 981 
Kushner, H. and Sterk, C., 2005. The Limits of Social Capital: Durkheim, Suicide 
and Social Cohesion. American Journal of Public Health, 9 (7), 1139–1143. 
Lacoue-Labarthe, P., 1993. Catastrophe: a reading of Celan’s ‘The Merdian’. Oxford 
Literary Review, 15 (12), 3-42. 
Lockwood, D., 1992. Solidarity and Schism: the Problem of Disorder" in 
Durkheimian and Marxist Sociology. Oxford University Press. 
Lukes, S. and Prabhat, D., 2012. Durkheim on law and morality: the disintegration 
thesis. Journal of Classical Sociology, 12 (3-4), 363-383. 
Lukes, S., 1967. Alienation and Anomie. In: P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman, eds. 
Philosophy, Politics and Society. Oxford: Blackwell, 134-156. 
Lukes, S., 1973. Emile Durkheim: his life and work a historical and critical study, 
London: Allen Lane. 
McGuirk, J.N., 2010. Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction and the Question of the 
Existential Foundations of Rational Life. International Journal of Philosophical 
Studies, 18 (1), 31-56. 
Merleau-Ponty, M., 2006 The Structure of Behaviour. Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press. 
Merton, R.K., 1993. Social Structure and Anomie. In: C. Lemert, ed. Social Theory: 
the Multicultural Readings. Boulder: Westview Press, 248-261. 
Pearce, F., 1979. The Radical Durkheim. London: Unwin. 
Sartre, J-P., 1964. Nausea. Tr. L. Alexander. New York: New Directions. 
Sirianni, C.J., 1984. Justice and the division of labour: a reconsideration of 
Durkheim’s Division of Labour in Society. Sociological Review, 32 (3), 449-
470. 
Sumner, C., 1994. Sociology of Deviance: an Obituary. Buckingham: Open 
University Press 
Taylor, S., 1982. Durkheim and the Study of Suicide. London: Macmillan. 
